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Punitive Damages Against Shipowners
Arthur E. Miller*
N OT LONG AGO a federal district court decision awarded punitive dam-
ages in admiralty against a corporate shipowner, for personal injury
and death of crew members through the conduct of the ship's master
which was imputed to and ratified by the corporation. This was in the
case of Petition of the United States Steel Corporation as Owner of the
Steamship Cedarville.' Punitive damages in maritime cases seldom have
been awarded. It is seriously to be questioned whether punitive damage
awards should be expanded as a modern trend in admiralty decisions.
Much of our national maritime policy is deep-rooted in the body of
American admiralty law. Traditionally, Congress and the courts of ad-
miralty have viewed the merchant seaman as within their protective
custody because of the inherent danger of his calling and the unique
status of his contract of employment. To encourage shipbuilding and
develop the American Merchant Marine, similar protection has been ex-
tended to the shipowner by enabling him to limit his financial risks in
the event of disaster. Conversely, the concept of punitive damages finds
no statutory support in our maritime law and has been so seldom award-
ed as to make questionable its acceptance.
In the above-titled landmark admiralty decision, hereinafter referred
to as the Cedarville' case, an Ohio District Court in 1967 awarded puni-
tive damages under the survival provisions of the Jones Act2 for loss of
life in a Great Lakes disaster. The policy considerations of the decision
are significant in that the corporate shipowner was subjected to unlim-
ited liability in deference to the claims of the deceased seamen, by im-
puting to it punitive liability for the actions of the ship's master, whom
the court characterized as the corporate alter-ego s
Although the case was reversed in part by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, 4 in Spring 1969 (see Editor's Note at end of this article), it
still stands in part, and has potential for real harm to American admiralty
law and maritime enterprise.
* BA., Univ. of Virginia; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State Univ.; Cargo Manager at Oglebay Norton Company, of Cleveland.
1 276 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
2 46 U.S.C. 688 (1920); see also 45 U.S.C. 51 (1908); 45 U.S.C. 59 (1910).
3 Petition of United States Steel Corp., supra note 1, at 198.
4 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F. 2d 1143 (6th Cir., Mar. 7, 1969).
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I
Admiralty Jurisdiction
Authority for admiralty and maritime issues5 is conferred on the
national judiciary by the United States Constitution." The Judiciary
Act of 1789 directed specific jurisdiction of these matters to the Federal
District Courts.7 Congressional authority to legislate on behalf of sea-
men is derived from its constitutional power to regulate commerce.,
Therefore, paramount jurisdiction for interpretation of maritime law is
vested in the Federal Courts, and power to legislate thereon rests in the
national Congress. 9 Congress has enacted laws sanctioning enforcible
rights both in Federal and State Courts, but only on the admiralty side
of the Federal Court can a judge decide issues without a jury.10
The American Merchant Seaman
American maritime law evidences its parental concern for the care
of its merchant seamen. They are considered to. be the wards of the
Admiralty." This is so because of the risks of their work and their status
on a ship, which find no comparison in shore-side employment. 1 2 A ship
is an independent entity, with only one captain who commands strict
obedience from all aboard. 13 In this setting, the seaman's contract is still
considered an exception to the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment
in that it involves surrender of his personal liberty.14 As a result of this
relationship, it is generally recognized that the vessel owner is placed
in loco parentis, and the captain is made the legal guardian of the sea-
man.
15
Seamen in most instances have been exempted from the common law
rules of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, while remedial
legislation has been liberally applied by the courts in their favor.' 6 To
further insure their safety, Congress enacted the Seamen's Act of 1920.11
5 See generally, Edleman, Maritime Injury and Death 2-3 (1960); Panama Railroad
Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 44 S. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed. 748 (1924).
6 Art. III, See. 2.
7 28 U.S.C.A. 41, 371.
8 Art. I, Sec. 8.
9 Edleman, op. cit. supra note 5; Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, supra note 5.
10 Ibid.
11 Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, 485 (D.C. Me. 1823); Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co., Inc.; 317 U.S. 239, 63 S. Ct. 246, 87 L. Ed. 239 (1942).
12 See generally, Robinson, Admiralty 279-283 (1939).
13 Southern Steamship Company v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31, 38, 62 S. Ct. 886, 86 L. Ed.
1246 (1942).
14 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 17 S. Ct. 326, 41 L. Ed. 715 (1897).
15 Ibid; Harden v. Gordon, supra note 11; Petition of United States Steel Corp., supra
note 1, at 172; U.S.C.A. Const. Amndt. 13.
16 46 U.S.C.A. 688 note 15 at 41; Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424,
59 S. Ct. 262, 83 L. Ed. 265 (1939).
17 Supra note 2.
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The Jones Act
General maritime law provided no recovery for a seaman injured
through the negligence of the ship's captain nor did a cause of action for
personal injuries survive his death.18 To rectify this situation, Congress
enacted the Seamen's Act of 1920,19 hereinafter referred to as the Jones
Act. The Jones Act provided the first means through which crew mem-
bers could attach liability to their shipowner-employers for the negli-
gence of the master, other crew members, or the shipowner himself.20
The Jones Act incorporated the provisions of the Federal Employers'
Liability Acts (FELA) 21 by extending to the seaman the remedies avail-
able to railway workers injured in the scope of their employment. 22 It
further allowed the seaman an election to maintain a civil action for
damages with the right of trial by jury not available in an admiralty pro-
ceeding.23 The survival and death provisions 24 of the Jones Act were
likewise incorporated from the FELA.25 As a death statute, the FELA
is modeled after the Lord Campbell's Wrongful Death Act 20 which ex-
tended a right of compensation for pecuniary loss to the beneficiary as
a result of the wrongful death of the deceased .2  The original FELA of
1908 was amended in 1910 to provide a further right to designated bene-
ficiaries for pain and suffering endured before death.28 This claim sur-
vived the decedent and preserved for the benefit of his beneficiaries the
same right of action to which he would have been entitled had he lived.29
The 1910 survival amendment was likewise incorporated into the Jones
Act.30 Therefore, there can be no recovery for the decedent's suffering
prior to death if the action under the FELA or Jones Act is for his
wrongful death alone; recovery for suffering before death must be based
on decedent's right to the claim which survives his death under the 1910
18 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 12, at 309; Boeckman, Punitive Damages in Admiralty,
18 Hastings L. J. 995, 1005 (1967).
19 Supra note 2.
20 46 U.S.C.A. 688 note 10, at 37; Edleman, op. cit. supra note 5, at 3, 82.
21 45 U.S.C. 51-60.
22 Supra note 20; Robinson, op. cit. supra note 12, at 311; Prosser, Law of Torts 561
(3 ed. 1964).
23 Supra note 20, at 38; Edleman, op. cit. supra note 5, at 63; Panama Railroad Co. v.
Johnson, supra note 5.
24 45 U.S.C. 59 (1910).
25 Supra note 20, at 38.
26 9 and 10 Vict., Ch. 93 (1846).
27 Michigan Central Railroad Company v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 69, 57 L. Ed. 417
(1913).
28 Supra note 24.
29 45 U.S.C.A. 59.
30 Supra note 20,
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amendment.3 ' The two causes of action are distinct.
32 Any conscious 33
physical or mental 34 pain or suffering endured in an appreciable period
of time 35 between injury and death will satisfy the requirements. It was
under the survival provision that Cedarville36 awarded punitive dam-
ages. Neither the Jones Act nor the FELA specifically provide for the
recovery of punitive damages.
The Shipowner and Limitation of Liability
The American shipowner has likewise enjoyed the concerned atten-
tion of Congress. Maritime usages long have recognized that the vessel
entrepreneur would have little incentive to risk his financial resources
or entertain the idea of borrowing substantial funds for construction if
he had to face unlimited liability from a multitude of interests should
a catastrophe at sea occur.87 Historically, the shipowner was at a dis-
advantage with his landed competitor, who, by forming a corporation,
could avoid losing his entire fortune.
38
As a means of developing the American Merchant Marine in order
to remain competitive in the world market place, Congress passed the
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, 39 as an inducement to encourage ship
building.40 The Act of 1851 enabled the shipowner to limit loss even
though his (ault was established in a maritime disaster. To successfully
limit liabili+ the accident must have occurred without the privity or
knowledge 9f the shipowner. 41 Once fault is established, the Act of 1851
permitted the shipowner to petition the Court to limit his liability to a
stated sum comprised of the value of the ship following the disaster
42
and her pending freight, if any.43 Since the value of the ship was negli-
gible in the event of a sinking, the Act of 1851 was later amended to
provide that the value of the distributable fund could be no less than
31 Supra note 29, see note 5, at 344; Petition of United States Steel Corp., supra note
1, at 175.
32 Ibid.
33 Id. note 12, at 337, also note 13, at 340.
34 Edleman, op. cit. supra note 5, at 128, citing Civil v. Waterman Steamship Co., 217
F. 2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1954).
35 Supra note 33.
36 Petition of United States Steel Corp., supra note 1.
37 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 12, at 875-884; Edleman, op. cit. supra note 5, at 573-
575.
38 Ibid.
39 46 U.S.C. 181 et seq.
40 Butler v. Boston and S.S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527, 9 S. Ct. 612, 32 L. Ed. 1017 (1889);
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 273 U.S. 207, 47 S. Ct.
357, 71 L. Ed. 612 (1927).
41 46 U.S.C.A. 183 (a).
42 The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 6 S. Ct. 1150, 30 L. Ed. 134 (1886).
43 Supra note 41; 46 U.S.C.A. 185(a); Edleman, op. cit. supra note 5, at 575.
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$60.00 multiplied by the vessel's gross tonnage to extend coverage for
claims involving personal injury and death. 44 The shipowner was now
able to protect his personal resources and other ships in his fleet not
involved in the disaster.45 The provisions of the Act of 1851 are not to
be confused with the Harter Act 46 or the Carriage of Goods By Sea
Act,47 which completely exonerate the shipowner from liability for cargo
loss under certain conditions.48
The Act of 1851 did not provide that the conduct of the master im-
puted privity to the shipowner; that would defeat limitation. However,
under a later amendment, 49 the privity or knowledge of the master at
or prior to the commencement of the voyage was deemed that of the
owner with respect to loss of life or bodily injury.
It is important to remember that the Jones Act did not repeal the
earlier Limitation Statutes.50 Seamen's claims for personal injury and
death against the shipowner remained subject to his limitation even
though, in an action involving many interests, the amount recoverable
might be less than the full pecuniary loss granted under the Jones Act.51
Limitation of liability was not an issue in the Cedarville case. 52 The
corporate shipowner concentrated his defense against the claims for puni-
tive damages as a result of the events after the collision and before the
sinking. Nevertheless, discussion of shipowner limitation offers perspec-
tive to the policy of minimizing the scope of shipowner liability when
claims of injured seamen are presented in circumstances identical to
those in Cedarville.53 One can only appreciate the unprecedented scope
of Cedarville54 when one has an awareness of the carefully prescribed
legislative intent to confine the boundaries of shipowner loss.
H.
Punitive Damages in Admiralty
Punitive (exemplary) damages are awarded as a punishment for the
outrageous conduct 55 of the defendant, making him an example to deter
44 46 U.S.C.A. 183(b) (1935).
45 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 12, at 936.
46 46 U.S.C.A. 190.
47 46 U.S.C.A. 1300.
48 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 12, at 875.
49 46 U.S.C.A. 183(e) (1935).
50 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 12, at 908, 920; In Re Petition of East River TowingCo., 266 U.S. 355, 45 S. Ct. 114, 65 L. Ed. 324 (1924); 46 U.S.C.A. 688, at 136, 137.
51 Ibid.
52 Petition of United States Steel Corp., supra note 1.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Restatement of Torts, 2d, Sec. 908(1).
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future wrongdoers. 6 The award is justified as a matter of public policy, 57
and constitutes an exception to the rule that damages are intended only
to compensate the plaintiff for his loss.
58
Punitive damages were not awarded in an admiralty case prior to
1859,59 although the courts recognized the existence of the doctrine in
maritime law as early as 1818.60 Since they have been so seldom award-
ed, punitive damages are of questionable acceptance, although never
expressly rejected by admiralty courts. 61
Admiralty cases have discussed the necessary elements for making
the award, citing conscious misconduct with malicious and willful dis-
regard of individual rights. 62 An early case stated that punitive damages
could be awarded against a shipowner for injuries caused by the willful
and malicious acts of the ship's captain. 63 Although punitive damages




On May 7, 1965, the S.S. Cedarville sank forty minutes after a col-
lision with a foreign ship in dense fog. Ten crew members were lost, and
claimants were awarded punitive damages under the survival provisions
of the Jones Act for what the court described as "outrageous," "willful,"
and "horrendous" disregard for human safety on the part of the ship's
captain.67 The court found that the captain's decision to beach the vessel,
which had no reasonable chance of success, as opposed to ordering the
crew to abandon ship, evidenced a "grotesque" indifference for human
life.68 In this opinion, Judge Connell stated that, "the captain had an
aberration for saving property, and an amnesia for saving people." 69
56 Oleck, Damages to Persons and Property 27 (1961 rev. ed.); Oleck, Cases on Dam-
ages 91 (notes) (1962).
57 Id. at 541.
58 McCormick, Damages 275 (1935).
59 Boeckman, op. cit. supra note 18, at 996.
60 The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 4 L. Ed. 456 (1818); Petition of United
States Steel Corp., supra note 1, at 172.
61 Boeckman, op. cit. supra note 18, at 1008.
62 Boeckman, op. cit. supra note 59 (Id. at 996).
63 Ralston v. The State Rights, 20 Fed. Cas. 201 (E.D. Pa. 1836).
64 Ibid.
65 Petition of United States Steel Corp., supra note 1.
66 Ibid.
67 Id. at 167-170.
68 Id. at 199.
69 Id. at 196.
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Since radio-telephone communication was established between the
captain and his shore-side superiors immediately after the collision,
Judge Connell found that there was imposed on such superiors a duty
to speak in order to countermand the captain's decision to beach the
vessel.70 Their silence and refusal to interfere amounted to an express
ratification and clothed the captain with such unlimited authority as to
make him the alter-ego of the corporation. 71 His acts were "tantamount
to those of the board of directors." 72 He was not answerable to any
superior.
73
The Conduct of the Captain and Punitive Damages
As it relentlessly impugned the captain's conduct, the court was no
doubt moved by concern for the traditional protection afforded seamen
and a captain's parental duty for their care. The reasoning is not free
from doubt, and must be examined with respect to the judgment of the
captain in times of emergency, and the requisite intent, in order to find
a punitive award.
It is fundamental in maritime law that the conduct of a captain in
the frantic moments of grave emergency should not be judged by hind-
sight.74 He should not be condemned when every available choice would
not be free from danger. 75 A court should not substitute its judgment
in retrospect.76 If the captain fails it may be an error of judgment only,77
and in times of emergency or excitement "a choice may be mistaken, yet
prudent." 78
The conduct necessary to subject a wrongdoer to punitive damages
involves actual, positive and conscious elements of disregard or indiffer-
ence.7 9 The requisite malice of a captain 0 must be predicated on a guilty
intent."' Can it be clearly shown that the captain of the S.S. Cedarville
manifested such guilty intent?
70 Id. at 198-199.
71 Ibid.
72 Id. at 178-179.
73 Ibid.
74 Kelley Island Lime and Transport Company v. The City of Cleveland, et al., 1942
A.M.C. 1317 (N.D. Ohio 1942).
75 The Mohegan, 28 F. 2d 795 (2d Cir. 1928); The Walter A. Luckenbach, 14 F. 2d 100(9th Cir. 1926).
76 Reiss Steamship Co. v. The Claremont, 12 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. N.Y. 1935).
77 The Walter A. Luckenbach, supra note 75.
78 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 22, at 172.
79 McCormick, op. cit. supra note 58, at 280.
80 Ralston v. The State Rights, supra note 63.
81 Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107, 108, 13 S. Ct.
261, 37 L. Ed. 97 (1893); see also supra note 9, Supreme Court decisions and Federal
interpretation are controlling in maritime law.
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The captain of the Cedarville faced a choice between abandoning
ship in zero visibility with obscured vessel traffic nearby, or attempting
to save the ship and the crew by beaching the vessel. He chose the lat-
ter. His decision was the wrong one.
The court, however, had little trouble in deciding that his judgment
in a time of dire emergency was not only wrong but was also "horren-
dous," "outrageous," and "wanton." 82 The court was also able to find
the requisite element of positive guilty intent needed to assess punitive
damages. The captain's decision to beach the vessel was made with "an
aberration for saving property and an amnesia for saving people." 83
More remarkable is the fact that this determination was made by a court
that did not hear a single witness but probed the captain's mind through
evidence read by counsel from prior depositions and testimony taken
from official United States Coast Guard proceedings.
8 4
The Alter-Ego and Punitive Damages by Ratification
The master portrayed as the corporate alter-ego is not an unfamiliar
characterization in maritime law,8 5 but the scope of this concept has been
limited. In Cedarville,8 6 the court bound corporate superiors with an
affirmative duty to override the captain's decision. Their silence trans-
formed the captain into the alter-ego s 7 of the corporation. What are the
requirements of Federal law needed in order to impute punitive dam-
ages?
Punitive damages are not usually imputed to the employer-principal
for the conduct of the employee-agent unless he participated in or rati-
fied such conduct.8 8 This is especially so in the case of corporations,
which can only act through their agents; and there the loss eventually
falls on the blameless stockholders.8 9 The Federal rule is enunciated in
Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Prentice,90 which stated
that participation is needed to impute punitive liability to the principal.
Participation by silent acquiescence implying ratification can be estab-
82 Petition of United States Steel Corp., supra note 1; supra note 72.
83 Id. at 196.
84 Id. at 165, "This Court did not directly hear any witness, but all counsel had the
privilege of reading to the Court whatever evidence it chose, from both the Coast
Guard investigation and the depositions taken in these matters . '. " "The question
here presented to this Court by the reading of such testimony from these two sources
is limited to the question whether punitive damages may or ought to be assessed
in this case."
85 The Silver Palm, 94 F. 2d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 1937).
86 Petition of United States Steel Corp., supra note 1.
87 Id. at 198.
88 Oleck, op. cit. supra note 56, at Sec. 271 (par. 1); McCormick, op. cit. supra note 58,
at Sec. 80.
89 Ibid. (McCormick); Oleck, Cases on Damages 91 (notes) (1962).
90 Supra note 81, at 107, 112; see also Boeckman, op. cit. supra note 18, at 999.
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lished only if there is an affirmative corporate duty to speak, which the
court found mandatory in Cedarville."
Is there a unique relationship between the captain and the ship-
owner in times of emergency that will not permit divided or displaced
authority?
Maritime custom has acknowledged that the authority and decisions
of the captain in times of emergency should be free from outside inter-
ference. 92 He is on the scene, able to evaluate the circumstances, and
in the best position to make a decision because of his sailing experience.
It has long been the practice of the land-based shipowner not to hinder
the master's judgment. 93 The lack of any naval support or instruction to
the Captain of the U.S.S. Pueblo, in his time of crisis, is a current exam-
ple of this maritime tradition. There cannot be two captains of the same
ship.94
In each ship there is one man who in the hour of emergency or peril
at sea can turn to no other man. There is one who alone is ulti-
mately responsible for the safe navigation, engineering performance,
accurate gunfire and morale of his ship. He is the commanding offi-
cer. He is the ship!
Bronze Plaque: Office of Chief of U.S. Naval Operations9 5
Punitive Damages Under the Jones Act
The propriety of a punitive award under the Jones Act is not at all
clear. It is important to remember that the Jones Act incorporated the
FELA, whose wrongful death provisions were patterned after Lord
Campbell's Act. 0 There is authority for the rule that the FELA denies
punitive damage recoveries9" and that such damages cannot be recovered
under statutes modeled after Lord Campbell's Act.98 FELA and Jones
Act awards have been viewed as being limited to pecuniary loss for
death and compensatory damage for pain and suffering before death.99
There also is merit in the contention that the 1910 survival amend-
ment of the FELA is unrelated to Lord Campbell's Act.100
91 Petition of United States Steel Corp., supra note 1.
92 The Walter A. Luckenbach, supra note 75; President of India v. West Coast S.S.Co., 213 F. Supp. 352, 358 (D.C. Oreg. 1962); The North Star, 3 F. 2d 1010, 1011(D.C. Mass. 1925); The Princess Sophia, 61 F. 2d 339, 349, 352 (9th Cir. 1932).
93 Ibid.
94 The North Star, supra note 92, at 1011.
95 Bucher of the Pueblo, Life, February 7, 1969, at 15.
96 Supra note 22, 26.
97 McCormick, op. cit. supra note 58, at 287.
98 Annot., 94 A.L.R. 384-386 (1935).
99 Michigan Central Railroad Company v. Vreeland, supra note 27; 45 U.S.C.A. 59
note 5, at 334; McDonald v. The Barge 204, 194 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Ala. 1961).100 Petition of United States Steel Corp., supra note 1, see generally 174-176.
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IV.
Summary and Conclusions
Cedarville'0 ' is important because it awarded punitive damages in
an admiralty case, made the first such award under the Jones Act, ruled
that the claim survived death, and imputed punitive liability to a ship-
owner for the conduct of its master in a time of emergency. The decision
is novel in that the above issues have been very arguable in maritime
law. To affirmatively decide so many issues of questioned legal validity
is to give the Cedarville10 2 case an almost unprecedented scope in ad-
miralty law.
Aside from its legal implications, the case may introduce serious
ramifications in our maritime policy, i.e., shipbuilding cannot be en-
couraged by an atmosphere of unlimited liability for vessel owners.
The recent past history of the American Great Lakes fleet is far
from encouraging. Vessel construction and repair costs have skyrocket-
ed, and a new American vessel has not been built since 1960. Our Cana-
dian competitors, on the other hand, have built many new maximum size
ships during the past ten years, through a government subsidy which
permits vessel construction at 55% of the comparable American cost.10 3
In 1953, 403 U.S. flag ships operated on the Great Lakes; in 1963, the
same fleet consisted of 269 ships of which 60% were over 40 years old.10 4
From the ten-year period 1953 to 1963, the United States Merchant Ma-
rine fleet declined 11%; in the five-year period 1958-1963, the Great
Lakes segment of this fleet declined 22%.105 The Great Lakes vessel
industry has always been part of the American economic and military
backbone. 1 6 During World War II it kept 90% of the nation's steel
industry supplied with iron ore. 07
The integrated or private carriers, such as the Great Lakes fleet of
the United States Steel Corporation, operate on the Great Lakes to pro-
vide raw materials for the large steel companies who own and operate
them. Capital will always be provided by the parent firm because it
must maintain its means of supply.
The position of the common carrier and small independent is very
different. These carriers serve the public demand for transportation and
materials. They must justify their existence by making a profit in trans-
1o Petition of United States Steel Corp., supra note 1.
102 Ibid.
103 Vessel Construction Program To Aid Domestic Trades: Hearings Before The
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee of the Committee on Commerce,




1o7 Id. at 73.
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portation-for-hire alone, not as a mere incident of service to a larger firm.
Unlike the private carrier with unlimited financial resources, they are
able to invest in shipbuilding only profit made from transportation
operations per se.
These small carriers have struggled to exist in the shadow of the
private carriers who have no obligation to provide dependable public
service at non-discriminatory rates. 0 8 Their very existence is addition-
ally threatened by predatory railroad competition. 0 9 At least ten small
independent vessel companies have gone out of business on the Great
Lakes since 1960.110
The concept of punitive damages against a shipowner should be
strictly confined and not become a general proposition of admiralty law.
The national shipbuilding policy would be dealt another setback if the
already beleagured public transportation segment of the Great Lakes
vessel industry had to expend its diminishing margin of return for pro-
tection instead of capital needed to stay in business.
[Editor's Note: When proofs of this article were being read, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court, as
to ratification of the actions of the ship's captain, which was necessary
in order to validate punitive damages against the owner."' But this re-
versal left unaffected the District Court's holding that under the Jones
Act survival provisions, punitive damages could be awarded (yet did not
decide that such award is proper under the Jones Act). The Appeals
Court, in effect, spoke only of the "ratification" and said that company
officers were not obliged to countermand or decide the captain's orders.]
108 Id. at 236.
109 Decline of Coastwise and Intercoastal Shipping Industry: Hearings Before The
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, United States Senate 118, 124 (1960).
110 Supra note 103, at 96.
111 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir., Mar. 7, 1969).
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